[Discussion] [Governance] - BAP-001: Ratifying the BOB DAO Mission Charter

Author: Coinyak

Date: [2026-04-29]

Related links: BOB DAO Governance Charter - https://docs.gobob.xyz/assets/files/bob-dao-charter-v1-0-82d9bf1cc29070c51df8965e9dba786c.pdf

1. Summary

This proposal asks the BOB DAO to formally ratify its Mission Charter - the foundational principles that define what the DAO exists to do, how it governs itself, and how it manages treasury funds. Ratification turns these principles from a draft into the community’s binding governance framework.

2. Motivation

During the Token Generation Event for BOB, The BOB Foundation committed that $BOB token holders would have governance rights over the protocol, with BOB DAO Delegation live from Day 1.

44.76% of the total token supply was allocated to Ecosystem & Community, to be stewarded by the BOB Foundation together with the BOB DAO via on-chain governance as outlined in the official BOB tokenomics.

The on-chain infrastructure to deliver on that commitment is now operational at http://gov.gobob.xyz - delegation, voting, and proposal submission all work.

What has not yet happened is formal community endorsement of the governance framework itself: the mission, the proposal process, the multisig structure, and the rules governing treasury decisions.

BAP-001 is intentionally the first proposal. It fulfils the Foundation’s original commitment by putting the governance framework to a community vote, making token holders - not any single entity - the source of legitimacy for the rules. Every future proposal, whether it allocates treasury funds, upgrades the protocol, or modifies governance itself, depends on this foundation being in place.

3. Proposed Change

This proposal asks the community to formally adopt the BOB DAO Governance Document as the binding governance framework for the DAO.

The document covers:

Mission: The BOB DAO exists to accelerate the adoption of Bitcoin as global financial infrastructure for the masses - spending, saving, borrowing, earning, everything - with trust built into protocols, not manufactured through layers of intermediaries.

Core pillars: Bitcoin global financial infrastructure (Gateway, Vaults, consumer products), Technical (protocol infrastructure, smart contracts, security), and Growth & Ecosystem (integrations, partnerships, community programs).

Governance process: A four-stage cycle - Discussion, Proposal Submission, Voting, and Implementation - with defined thresholds (0.07% of total supply to submit, 0.5% of total supply for quorum, >50% to pass, 7-day voting period, 7-day timelock).

Proposal types: All proposals related to BOB will be referred to as BOB Acceleration Proposals (BAPs). There are 3 types of BAP: Spending Proposals (treasury allocations), Technical Proposals (technical upgrades), and Governance & Structural Proposals (changes to the framework itself).

Delegate system: Open registration, permissionless delegation, and three focus areas (Bitcoin global financial infrastructure, Technical, Growth & Ecosystem).

Multisig: Initially, a 4-of-5 multisig wallet secures DAO funds, composed of a Foundation Director, two active community members, a financial expert, and a technical expert. The multisig executes approved proposals and holds veto authority over malicious or harmful actions. Over time, the treasury will be moved on-chain into a DAO-governed smart contract.
Future governance: The framework is designed to evolve. Structures, roles, and processes can be adapted through future Governance & Structural Proposals as the community’s needs change.

The full BOB DAO charter can be reviewed here: BOB DAO Charter

No transitional arrangements are required. The governance infrastructure is already operational; this proposal formalises community endorsement of the rules governing it.

4. Rationale

Every DAO needs a starting point - a baseline set of rules the community agrees to operate under before it begins making decisions. Without this, there is no shared reference for what constitutes a valid proposal, how votes are conducted, or who has authority over funds.

Ratifying the governance document as the first BAP ensures that the community - not any single team or entity - is the source of legitimacy for the framework. It also sets a precedent: governance structures at BOB are not imposed, they are proposed, discussed, and voted on like anything else.

Alternative approaches were considered, such as launching governance without a formal ratification vote and simply treating the framework as accepted by default. This was rejected because it undermines the principle of community sovereignty that the DAO is built on.

5. Impact on Stakeholders

Token holders: Gain a formally endorsed governance framework that protects their interests and defines how their voting power is exercised.

Delegates: Receive a clear mandate and defined responsibilities for how they represent token holders and participate in governance.

The Foundation: Transitions from being the sole author of governance rules to operating within a framework endorsed by the community.

Multisig members: Their composition, authority, and responsibilities become formally ratified, including the 4-of-5 threshold and veto power.

Builders and ecosystem participants: Gain clarity on how to engage with the DAO - how proposals work, what gets funded, and where to contribute.

Service provider: Upon passing of the proposal, it will be ratified that Scopelift will act as the on-chain voting platform for the BOB DAO to submit and vote on BAPs.

6. Implementation Notes

If this proposal passes, the BOB DAO Charter becomes the official, community-ratified governance framework.

The practical effect is that all future proposals, votes, and treasury actions will be governed by the rules set out in this document. Any changes to the framework itself would require a new Governance & Structural Proposal and community vote.

7. Precedent & References

Ratifying a governance framework or constitution as the first community action is standard practice among well-governed DAOs. Comparable precedents include Arbitrum’s AIP-1 (ratification of the Arbitrum DAO Constitution), Optimism’s Working Constitution, and ENS DAO’s foundational governance proposal. Each of these established the baseline rules before any spending or technical decisions were put to a vote.

8. Conflicts of Interest

The author has previously worked with the BOB Foundation as an evangelist and community contributor. This involvement included supporting community growth and communications around the project.

The author is not directly compensated based on the outcome of this proposal and does not receive additional financial benefit if this proposal passes.

The governance document being ratified was originally authored by the Foundation, and the author’s views may be aligned with the Foundation’s perspective.

9. Open Questions for the Community

This is where we need your input.

  • Is there anything in the governance document that is unclear, missing, or that you believe should be revised before the community formally adopts it?

This discussion phase is your opportunity to shape BAP-001 before it goes to a vote. Read the full governance document, share your perspective, and help us get this right.

10. Important: Before You Submit on the BOB voting platform

After discussion and feedback and before moving this proposal to a formal vote, the author will reply to this thread with:

  • A summary of the key feedback received

  • Changes made to the proposal as a result

  • Any feedback considered but not incorporated, and the reasoning

5 Likes

Everything from the charter is quite clear to me, but I would need clarity on some parts of the document

  • How will the 2 Active DAO Community Members be selected for the multisig composition? Will the selection be permanent or change over time?
  • 0.07% of the supply is required to submit a proposal; this applies to everyone, right? even after the topic has been approved in the discussion forum here?
3 Likes

Thank you for creating such an excellent charter.
I have a few questions and comments.

□ 1
Regarding the period between a proposal being approved and the multisig beginning execution:
Is the absence of a defined timeline intentional?

While the charter clearly specifies the number of days for each phase from proposal submission to voting, there is no defined timeframe for how long it may take from approval to actual execution.

I am concerned that if there is a difference in expectations or sense of urgency between the community and the multisig signers, the will of the community may not be fully respected.

□ 2
In this charter, is it permissible for the multisig to take direct action without going through governance in the event of a critical vulnerability or the need for an emergency update?
This would be similar to the “emergency powers” defined in some other DAOs.

If such actions are allowed, I believe it would be beneficial to establish at least some guidelines regarding the criteria for invoking this authority and how transparency should be maintained.

□ 3
I think the charter does a great job describing the process for allocating funds.
However, I believe one additional element worth including is the obligation for recipients to provide outcome reports.

For example, if funds are allocated for marketing activities, receiving feedback on the effectiveness of those efforts is important.
Having such data helps the DAO decide whether to continue funding similar marketing initiatives in the future, and it also leaves a useful precedent for future discussions.

Similarly, if a development project receives funding, it may be helpful to require progress reports, as well as clarity on whether unused funds must be returned.
While it may be difficult to enforce these obligations strictly, including them in the charter could serve as a framework that guides the behavior of proposal authors and grant recipients.

1 Like

How will the 2 Active DAO Community Members be selected for the multisig composition? Will the selection be permanent or change over time?

This will not be permanent and can be changed over time. Community members can also post in the discussion forum and vote on this topic. The current members have already been selected.

0.07% of the supply is required to submit a proposal — this applies to everyone, right?Even after the topic has been approved in the discussion forum?

Correct. Even after a topic is approved in the forum, if a community member does not have enough tokens to submit a proposal but the forum post is popular and delegates with enough tokens are supportive, another delegate can submit on their behalf. However, all topics must be posted on the forum for discussion first, regardless of whether the delegate has enough tokens to submit.

3 Likes

Good question

A1. The absence of a timeline is because this requires signature coordination across different groups (Foundation, Community Members, etc). Although coordination will start straight after voting, it is difficult to guarantee it will be signed by a specific time.

We suggest including a 7-day period, with consideration for things outside of governance control - for example, multisig signers may be unable or unreachable during this period, therefore causing delays.

A2. We propose adding an emergency clause to the charter: the multisig may take direct action without going through governance in the event of a critical vulnerability or emergency. Any such action must be disclosed publicly within 48 hours, and a full explanation submitted to the governance forum within 7 days.

A3. We agree to add this requirement to the charter - and it should also be included in each proposal requesting funds. In order to demonstrate credibility and trustworthiness to the community, proposal authors should commit to measurement, reporting and optimisation as required.

3 Likes

Hi Coinyak,

Thank you for your response. I agree with what you shared as well. I believe it will help create a better balance in DAO governance.

Thanks again.

1 Like